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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RONALD ALBERT ABRAM, a/k/a 
Ronald A. Rasmussen, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12609 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Bastardy Action brought pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, § 77-60-1 et seq., as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Criminal suit was filed against defendant-appellant 
for the crime of Bastardy. Trial by jury was held before 
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, at St. George, 
Washington County, State of Utah. Defendant-appellant 
was found guilty of the crime of bastardy. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks that the jury verdict and judg. 
ment on the verdict be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees substantially with the statement 
of facts as set forth in Appellant's brief but wishes to add 
the following: 
Appellant and Prosecutrix were considering marriage 
during the summer of 1969. Appellant left to enroll at 
Brigham Young University in September of 1969 but re-
turned to St. George around the 25th of September. On 
or about that date appellant had sexual relations with 
prosecutrix, which resulted in pregnancy of prosecutrix. 
Appellant refused to marry prosecutrix and an action of 
bastardy was brought under the Bastardy Act, 77-60-1 
et seq., U. C. A. (1953), as amended. 
Appellant, Ronald Albert Abram, was convicted of : 
the crime of bastardy after a jury trial held before the · 
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, a Judge of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Utah, at St. George, 
Washington County, State of Utah, on April 14, 1971. 
A court order had been issued dated March 17, 1971, : 
in which appellant's motion to suppress the introduction 
of a letter purported to have been sent by appellant was 
denied. This letter was entered as an element of proof 
by respondent. 
The court allowed testimony concerning appellant's 
associations with men other than respondent up to June 
3 
of 1969. After testimony by respondent's doctor, estab-
lishing the period of conception, the court limited this 




IN LIGHT OF THE MORE RECENTLY 
PASSED UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY, 
78-45a-1 et seq., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953), PROSECUTION OF THE BASTARDY 
ACT, 77-60-1 et seq., U. C. A. (1953), AS 
AMENDED DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A 
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE 
LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Appellant contends that he had been denied equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and cites the case of State v. Shondell, 22 
Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d 146 (1960), citing McDonald v. 
Commondwealth of Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 Sup. 
Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 543. The Shondell case refers to two 
statutes, one of which was a misdemeanor and the othell 
of which was a felony. This is clearly distinguishable 
from the defendant's case as the Bastardy Act and the 
Uniform Act on Paternity have precisely the same reme-
dies. Utah Code Ann. § 77-60-7 (1953), as amended, 
states: 
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"In case the issue is found against the defendant 
... the court shall order that he pay to the clerk 
of the court a reasonable sum for support, main. 
tenance and education of the child until said chila 
shall reach its 18th birthday, together with the 
actual hospital and medical expense incurred by 
the mother in prenatal care and delivery of sucn 
child .... " 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-60-11 (1953), dealing with bastardy 
support states: 
"In case of wilful default in the payment when 
due of any installment according to the condition 
of the bond or judgment the court may adjudge 
the defendant guilty of contempt by reason o! 
such nonpayment ... " 
The Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. ~ 7~ 
45a-1 et seq. (1953), as amended, has the same remedies 
as the Bastardy Act. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45a-1 states: 
"The father of a child which is or may be born 
out of wedlock is liable . . . for the reasonable ex-
pense of the mother's pregnancy and confinemenl 
and for the education, necessary support ana 
funeral expenses of the child." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-5 states: 
"The district court has jurisdiction of an action 
under this act and all remedies for and enforce-
ment of judgments for expenses of pregnancy ~a 
confinement for a wife and for the educati?~ 
necessary support, or funeral expenses for legiti· 
mate child apply." 
5 
Thus, contempt proceedings would be a proper remedy 
to enforce a judgment which was obtained under the Uni-
form Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-1 et 
seq. (1953), as amended, as well as the Bastardy Act. 
In protecting Fourteenth Amendment rights the 
court in the case of State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 
355 P. 2d 689 (1960) states: 
"The discrimination must be unreasonable or arbi-
trary to be unconstitutional. In construing a stat-
ute, all doubt should be resolved in favor of con-
stitutionality." (Citing People v. Pibor, et al., 85 
Cal. App. 789, 260 P. 303 and State v. Mason, 
(1938), 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 
330.) 
As forestated, the ultimate remedies of the Bastardy Act 
and the Uniform Act on Paternity are the same and thus 
cannot be construed to be unreasonable or arbitrary and 
should be found to be constitutional. 
POINT II. 
THE BASTARDY ACT, 77-60-1, 2, AND 3, U. 
C. A. (1953), AS AMENDED HAS NOT BEEN 
REPEALED BY IMPLICATION BY THE 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY, 78-45a-1 
et seq., U. C. A. (1953). 
A. To repeal a statute or any portion of a statute 
by implication, the court must look to the intent of the 
legislature. The Uniform Act on Paternity, U. C. A., 
~ 78-45a-1 et seq. (1953), as amended, was introduced 
6 
into the 1965 Legislature as House Bill 33. This propos~ 
statute was essentially a draft of the Uniform Act or 
Paternity found in the Uniform Laws Annotated, W~ 
Publisher 1966. Section 17 of the Uniform Act on Patern 
ity, Uniform Laws Annotated, and House Bill 33 providel 
for the repeal of the Bastardy Act through the followin; 
language: 
"All laws or parts of acts inconsistent with till 
act are hereby repealed." 
The legislature deliberately and intentionally deleted th! 
portion of House Bill 33 when passing the Uniform Art 
on Paternity, U. C. A. § 78-45a-l, et seq. (1953), lli 
amended. The clear intent of the legislature was to con 
tinue the validity of the Bastardy Act, U. C. A. § 77-60-l. 
et seq. ( 1953) , as amended, as an effective weapon thal 
a pregnant woman could use to bring the reputed fathe1 
of her child before the court. To repeal the Bastard\ 
Act would be to effectively reduce the forces of compul· 
sion by which a father of an illegitimate child can be com 
pelled to support such child. Where expressed tenns d 
repeal are not used, the presumption is always again': 
intention to repeal an earlier statute. U. S. v. Kushner 
C. C. A. N. Y., 135 F. 2d 668, cert. den., 36 S. Ct. 144i 
320 U. S. 212, 87 L. Ed. 1850, reh. den., 64 S. Ct. 32, 3X 
U. S. 808, 88 L. Ed. 488 (1943); California Drive-Im 
Restaurant Association v. Clark, 140 P. 2d 657, 22 Cal 
2d 287 (1943). 
The 1971 Legislature also amended Utah Code Ann 
§ 77-60-12, dealing with custody of an illegitimate chil0 
., 
under the Bastardy Act, and Utah Code Ann. § 77-60-14, 
dealing with the marriage of parties under the Bastardy 
Act, supplying additional evidence of its intention to re-
tain the validity of the Bastardy Act. 
B. The principal of repealing a statute by implica-
tion is not favored by the Utah Supreme Court. See 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
103 Utah 186, 134 P. 2d 474 (1943) and Thompson v. 
Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. 2d 761 (1943). To repeal the 
statute by implication requires the court to place or to 
put itself in the place of the legislature and determine 
the intent of the legislature. This is not required in light 
of the enactment of the Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45a-1 et seq. (1953), as amended, as the 
Legislature has clearly shown their intention when enact-
ing such statute. 
POINT III. 
A TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVI-
DENCE. 
In considering all surrounding circumstances, the 
identity and authenticity of the letter was reasonably 
established. 
In a number of cases where necessity demanded proof 
other than proof of handwriting, it has been held that 
the authenticity or genuineness of a letter may be estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence. 
8 
"A letter received through the mails is not admis.,1. 
ble in evidence when offered by the recipient, withou/ 
proof of its authenticity," Kent & Downs v. Wadlei 
Southern Railway Co., 136 Ga. 857, 759, 72 S. E. 4Ii 
(1911), but proof of its execution may be shown by cir. 
cumstantial evidence, Cocroft v. Cocroft, 158 Ga. 714, 
124 S. E. 346 (1924); Cotton States Mutual Insuranci 
Co. v. A. J. Clark, 114 Ga. App. 439, 151 S. E. 780 (1966); 
and 9 A. L. R. 984. 
In Singleton v. Bremer, 16 S. C. L. (Harp.) 20! 
( 1824) , it was held that a letter received through the mali 
was admissible into evidence even though it was pw· 
portedly sent by a person who could not write by a show· 
ing that it stated facts which could only be known t.o, or 
relate to, the purported sender. The case followed tbf 
theory that necessity justified a resort to circumstantial 
evidence to authenticate a letter. 
In Commonwealth v. Drum, Appellant, 42 Pa. Supe1. 
Ct. 156 ( 1910) , the court looked to the total circumstanre 
surrounding an unsigned typewritten letter and then ad 
mitted the letter into evidence. Facts considered were: 
The postmark on the letter was from the place where tbr 
purported writer carried on his business; the subject o! 
the letter was one particularly within the knowledge d 
the person who was claimed to have written it; and tb1 
purported writer had a special motive. 
Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2148, Third Ed., states: 
"However, where the necessity above mention~ 
does in fact exist, namely, the impossibility of o~ 
taining handwriting testimony, it would seem to 
follow that resort must be had to the evidence 
from contents - at any rate, in some circum-
stances or upon the facts of a particular case." 
In People v. Adams, 127 N. W. 354, 162 Mich. 371 
(1910), the court admitted into evidence certain letters 
and telegrams although it was not proven that the pur-
ported writer signed them in any way other than through 
the connection that they intrinsically showed to a previ-
ous conversation. 
In this case for seduction the complainant's mother 
testified that she had been approached by the defendant 
who told her of his wrong-doing and that he was in fact 
a married man but would soon get a divorce. The de-
fendant purportedly sent letters to the complainant's 
mother and telegrams which bore his name and contained 
allusions to the subject theretofore discussed between 
them. The court concluded: 
"We think that they were competent evidence, 
although it was not shown that he signed, or sent 
them in any other way than through the connec-
tion that they intrinsically showed to the previous 
conversation, and the arrangement that he should 
write. This furnished some evidence of their genu-
ineness, which thus became a question for the 
jury." 
The evidence clearly indicates that appellant wrote 
the subject letter. Although the postmark was smudged, 
the zip code clearly shows that the letter was mailed from 
Provo· also the last letter of the word Provo appears 
' ' clearly (T-63). It was established that appellant was 
10 
enrolled in school at Brigham Young University at the 
time this letter was sent from Provo. 
The letter refers to certain documents in the first 
paragraph. These documents were those to which appel-
1 
lant referred in a telephone conversation held a few days 
prior to the letter's delivery between the appellant and 
the prosecutrix's mother (T-56). Clearly, this informa-
tion indicates a manifest probability that the subject 
matter of the letter was known only to the apparent 
writer, the appellant, and to the person to whom it was 
written and mailed. 
Mrs. Etta Cheeney testified concerning the telephone 
conversation and letter; (T-54 through 56): 
Q. Did he call you the following Thursday? 
A. He did. 
Q. Where were you when you took the call? 
A. At home. 
Q. Do you know where he called you from? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. But did you talk to him? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What was said? 
A. He told me he had thought the ~atter 
over and that he would be wiling, he was gomg !° 
marry Lorraine if I would sign, have signed certam , 
statements and have them notarized and_ sent to i 
him, he wouldn't be responsible for anyth1~g af~r 
1 
the baby came. Like support or an_Ything lik~ 
this. That he could finish his schooling. And 
L 
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told him I would sign them and I would also send 
some money to come down here to St. George on. 
Q. And he said that he wanted you to sign 
some papers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that right? Did he say what kind of 
papers? 
A. He wanted me to notarize some state-
ments, and went to an attorney, I went to an at-
torney and told this attorney what he wanted, 
and the attorney said that it wouldn't be legal 
and I didn't need to do it. He said that I shouldn't 
have to be forced to do things like this. It wouldn't 
be legal. So for me to just go ahead and send him 
the money. So I did send him the money, but I 
didn't send him any statements. I just sent him 
the money. 
* * * 
Q. At the time you talked to him over the 
phone, did you discuss any marriage? 
A. He said he would marry Lorraine. 
Q. And what else did he say? 
A. Also said that I would sign these state-
ments and send them to him, these notarized 
statements that he wouldn't be responsible, that 
he would go ahead and get, get married, and then 
he would go back and finish his school. If I would 
send him some money so he could come down here 
to do it on. 
Q. But you never did send him the papers 
up, is that right? 
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. A. I didn't send no papers to him. I sent 
him money, but no papers. 
. Q. When did yon next have any communica. 
tion with the defendant? 
A. I got a letter from him. 
Q. Do you know about when you got the 
letter? 
A. Just a few days after the phone call. 
Q. And do you know where the letter crune 
from? 
A. It was postmarked Provo. 
Q. And who was the letter - did the letter 
come to you at your home? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. And who was the letter addressed to, do 
you remember? 
A. To me. 
The letter which was entered into evidence, stated 
in the first paragraph the letter's purpose: because Mrs. 
Cheeney "may have wondered the reason for such a state-
ment." This referred to the statements appellant asked 
Mrs. Cheeney to notarize. He tried to justify his request 
for such statements through the letter. 
Appellant argues that the prosecutrix could also have i 
known the subject matter of the letter. This contention 
goes to the credibility of the letter, not to its admissibil· 1 
ity. 
13 
Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2149 refers to the policy 
behind allowing a letter into evidence based solely upon 
the letter's content: 
"If there were a serious possibility of abuse, this 
step would not be advisable. But in fact there is 
also a danger in the opposite direction; for the 
difficulty of authenticating such a document is 
sometimes taken advantage of by those who wish 
to be able to disavow their authorship. It is, no 
doubt a question of experience, i.e. which danger 
is actually the greater. On a whole it would seem 
safe to authorize the trial court, in discretion, 
to allow to go to the jury a typewritten communi-
cation bearing sufficient indication of authenticity 
in its content and its letterhead." 
It is further submitted that admitting the letter into 
evidence was not prejudicial error. In the absence of the 
letter the jury's verdict would have been the same. 
The letter was only one aspect of the evidence which 
tended to prove the parenthood of the appellant. The 
appellant had spoken of marriage with prosecutrix (T-9). 
Appellant had opportunity to have sexual intercourse 
with prosecutrix during the period of conception, as he 
had returned from Provo on or about September 25, 1969 
(T-9). Appellant at no time denied parenthood of the 
child to prosecutrix's mother (T-91). The jury could see 
that the baby had marked similarities to appellant; they 
both have brown eyes, although the mother's eyes are 
blue, they have the same coloring, cheek structure, and 
dimples (T-65). There was no evidence refuting the 
prosecutrix's testimony. 
14 
The jury would have reached the same verdict with-
out reference to the letter and admitting it was not preju-
dicial error. 
POINT IV. 
CONFINING TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
PROSE CUTRI X'S ASS 0 CI AT I 0 N WITH 
MALES OTHER THAN APPELLANT TO A 
PERIOD OF ONE MONTH WAS PROPER. 
Sufficient evidence was offered which allowed the 
trial court in its discretion to limit testimony as to the 
period of conception. 
Appellant states that the only testimony establishing 
the period of gestation is that of prosecutrix and that of 
the doctor. The doctor's opinion was based upon that of 
prosecutrix. 
There is ample case law establishing the fact that in 
a bastardy action, testimony of the prosecutrix need not 
be corroborated. State v. Reese, 43 U. 447, 135 P. 270 
(1913); State v. Kranendonk, 79 U. 239, 9 P. 2d 176 
(1932); 1 A. L. R. 635. 
U. C. A. 1953, 77-60-5 states: 
"On the trial of every issue of fact as to the bas· 
tardy the mother and the defendant shall be com· 
petent witnesses and their credibility shall be left 
to the jury." 
Respondent, when visiting her own doctor concerning the 
birth of her child, told him when she had her last period. 
birth of her child, told him when she her last period. The 
15 
The doctor later delivered the baby at full term. The fact 
the baby was full term was testified to by the doctor (T-
106), prosecutrix's mother (T-64), and prosecutrix (T-
30). No evidence was offered to directly contradict the 
evidence. 
The court reasonably based the limitation of the per-
iod of conception upon testimony of the prosecutrix's 
doctor, Dr. Staheli. After testifying the child was full-
term at birth the doctor was asked by Mr. Isom, District 
Attorney, as follows: 
Q. Based on your examination of her attend-
ing this case, would you have, could you give me 
a statement on an estimate of when the concep-
tion took place? 
A. Well, we go by the date of the last men-
strual period and the date she gave me was Sep-
tember 15, 1969. Therefore, the conception prob-
ably would have occurred between September 25 
and October the 5th on an average. On an average 
we count as 14 days following the first day of the 
last menstrual period. But it certainly can occur 
within that ten-day range. 
Q. Would there, what would the, what would 
the chances be that she could have become preg-
nant after the 5th of October? 
A. Well, the chances would become much 
less after the 5th and extremely unlikely within a 
few days after that. 
Q. Say by the 15th of October, could she 
have, could she have become pregnant at that time 
or after. 
16 
A. I would think, and I think it would have 
been extremely unlikely, that she could have be-
come pregnant at that time. 
Q. Now, she couldn't have been pregnant 
prior to the 15th of September. Is that right? 
A. Right. 
Q. So it would have had to have been some 
time between the 15th of September and say the 
5th of October? 
A. I would say so, yes. 
Q. What is the normal period of gestation, 
Dr. Staheli? 
A. Normally figure 280 days, which again, is 
an average. A few days either way is very com· 
mon. 
Q. It could vary a few days before or after, 
is that correct? 
A. That is right. 
Q. But if the baby was full term, it normally 
wouldn't be much after that, is that right, or less 1 
than that? 
A. I am sorry. 
Q. If the baby was a full term baby, not pre· 
mature, and the chances of it being less than that 
time, what are they? 
A. Well, being significantly less than 280 
days, certainly, a week one way or the other isn't 
going to make much difference, probably. 
Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P. 2d 442, 449, 74 Cal. App. 2d 
652 (1942) states: 
17 
"Prima facie evidence is that which suffices for 
the proof of a particular fact, until contradicted 
and overcome by other evidence . . . The direct 
evidence of one witness who is entitled to full 
faith and credit is sufficient for proof of any fact, 
except perjury and treason . . . Whether Miss 
Berry was entitled to full credit, was for the jury, 
and the trial judge to determine. Estate of Gird, 
157 Cal. 534, 542, 108 P. 499, 137 Am. St. Rep. 
131; Estate of Snowball, 157 Cal. 301, 305, 107 
P. 598. She testified that she and defendant had 
four acts of sexual intercourse at or about the date 
when, in the ordinary course of nature, the child 
must have been begotten." 
Respondent offered a prima facie case against appel-
lant upon her own testimony which the jury was entitled 
to believe. The time period to be considered by the court 
was that time in which the ordinary course of nature, the 
child must have been conceived; September 15th to Oc-
tober 15th was within this period. The trial judge was 
correct in relying upon the testimony of respondent and 
the doctor in absence of evidence to the contrary. After 
considering all facts presented in such testimony, the per-
iod of September 15th to October 15th, 1969 was reason-
ably and correctly assumed to be the period of concep-
tion. 
The court in the Berry v. Chaplin, supra, case did 
not have the issue before it as to the date of conception. 
In that case it was stipulated by both the plaintiff's coun-
sel and defendant's counsel that the child was conceived 
on or about December 20, 1942. The period of conception 
was not directly approached. 
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Both the months of January and November were 
mentioned by the court in considering the period of con-
ception in the Chaplin case but the court's emphasis was 
given to the single month of December: 
"She testified that she had four acts of sexual in-
tercourse at or about the date when in the ordi-
nary course of nature, the child must have been 
begotten. These acts occurred on the 10th, 23rd, 
24th and 30th days of December, 1942." 
The court continued: 
"But even though complete or satisfactory proof 
had been made of sexual acts by Miss Berry with 
any other man on other occasions, it would still 
have been the exclusive function of the jury to 
determine whether defendant is the father of her 
child by virtue of his act in December, 1942." 
The court in its discretion can define the period of con· 
ception based upon the only evidence before the court. 
In the present case the court acted properly in excluding 
testimony other than acts which occurred between Sep· 
tember 15th to October 15th, which time was clearly 
within the period when in the normal course of nature 
the child must have been conceived where there was no 
evidence to the contrary. 
Although it was later limited to the period of one 
month, the court in fact did allow testimony as to prose· 
cutrix's association with males beyond the scope of Sep· 
tember 15th to October 15th, 1969. In the trial transcript, 
page 38, it states: 
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Mr. Scarth: Your honor, what I would like 
to do is establish the acquaintances of the com-
plaining witness, her male acquaintances. 
Mr. Isom: Your Honor -
Mr. Scarth: Find out if she had anything to 
do with them in 1969 prior to dating the accused, 
and whether she had anything to do with them 
after. 
The Court: Well, she has testified she did not 
after, and the court will find that prior to say, 
June or July of 1969 would be too remote to have 
possibly had conceived this particular child, born 
June 22nd. 
The above ruling by the court was in effect until the court 
heard further expert testimony by Dr. Clark Staheli. 
Before the doctor testified, appellant had called as wit-
nesses Maynard Rasmussen (T-92), Mary Lee Rasmus-
sen (T-97) and James Russell Bartorello (T-103). No 
offer of proof was made through any of these witnesses 
that respondent had had sexual relations other than with 
appellant in any period even without the limit set by the 
court. 
The court was unable to ascertain that it was, in 
fact, limiting testimony that would be probative of appel-
lant's contentions. Appellant made no offer of proof that 
would establish that respondent had sexual relations with 
any person outside of the one month period designated 
by the court. 
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The court in United States v. Stoppelmann, 266 F. 
2d 13 (1959), commented: 
"There was no offer to prove what the witness il 
permitted to testify, would have said. To warr~nt 
a reversal it is incumbent upon an appellant t-O 
show not only that technical error occurred but 
that the error was prejudicial, without knowing 
what the witness would have said if permitted t-0 
testify, it is impossible for us to conclude that 
defendant was prejudiced by the ruling now com-
plained of. The general rule is that a ruling re-
jecting testimony is not reviewable in the absence 
of an offer of proof." 
None of the witnesses called by appellant testified 
that they had any knowledge of any encounter or special 
association with any man other than respondent, nor was 
any evidence offered by appellant to refute the testimony 
of respondent pertaining to her activities, or pertaining 
to the testimony that the baby was full term. The court 
properly limited testimony and as to the period of con· 
ception. 
There was no prejudicial error because the testimony 
of the period of conception was limited to one month. 
To be prejudicial error, the error must be such that if it 
had not been committed the verdict probably would not 
have been the same. The jury had the duty to consider 
all evidence. After the respondent's unrefuted testimony, 
it was established that intercourse did in fact take place 
on or about September 25th, a period in which conception 
could normally take place. There was enough evidence 
offered to establish the guilt of appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant was given a fair trial in this case and has 
shown no valid reason why the court should not sustain 
the verdict of the jury. The policy of the law is to bring 
litigation to an end and not to grant new trials merely 
because one of the parties is unsatisfied with the result. 
As shown in Point I of this brief, appellant was not 
denied his constitutional right of equal protection. The 
procedures of the Bastardy Act, Utah Code Ann., Sec. 
77-60-1 to 3, are constitutional in light of the Uniform 
Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-45a-1, et seq. 
(1953), as amended. 
As shown in Point II, the clear intention of the legis-
lature was the continual validity of the Bastardy Act and 
therefore no implied repeals should be found. 
As shown in Point III the letter purported to have 
been sent by appellant was properly admitted into evi-
dence. A proper foundation had been laid and it was for 
the jury to determine the letter's weight. 
As shown in Point IV the trial court in its discretion 
limited testimony as to the period of conception to a one 
22 
month period. This was done only after substantial un-
controverted evidence had been presented. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, respondent respect. 
fully requests that the verdict of the jury and the judg. 
ment entered thereon be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
